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Abstract—To assure enterprise security, typically a SIEM 
(Security Information and Event Management) system is built to 
correlate security events from different preventive technologies 
and flag alerts.  Analysts in a security operations center (SOC) 
investigate the alerts to decide whether the related hosts are 
malicious or not. However, the number of alerts is overwhelming 
which exceeds the SOC’s capacity to handle and the false positive 
rate is also really high. Consequently, there is a great need to 
reduce the false alarms as much as possible. Instead of detecting 
network intrusion from outside of the enterprise, this paper 
focuses on detecting compromised hosts within enterprise by an 
intelligent Deep learning system. Our system leverages alert 
information, various security logs and analysts’ investigation 
results in a real enterprise environment to identify hosts with high 
likelihood of being compromised. Text mining and graph-based 
method are used to generate targets and extract features. In order 
to validate the effectiveness of our model, other machine learning 
algorithms such as Multi-layer Neural Network, Deep Neural 
Network, Random Forest etc. are applied to the same enterprise 
data. The results indicate that the Deep Belief Network (DBN) 
performs much better than other algorithms and is 6 times more 
effective than the current rule-based system. What is more, due to 
its effectiveness, this compromised host detection system has been 
implemented in a real enterprise production environment, which 
includes data collection, label creation, feature engineering and 
host score generation.  
Keywords—machine learning system; deep belief network; risky 
host detection 
I. INTRODUCTION  
    Cyber security incidents, especially data breaches, will cause 
significant financial and reputation impacts on an enterprise. In 
2015, IBM and Ponemon Institute conducted research on the 
cost due to data breach in 62 companies. The average cost of 
data breach is $6.5 million [1]. In order to detect malicious 
activities, a SIEM (Security Information and Event 
Management) system is built in companies or government. The 
system normalizes and correlates events logs (the raw data is 
organized to reduce and eliminate redundancy/error/noise) from 
endpoint, firewalls, intrusion detection systems, DNS (Domain 
Name System), DHCP (Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol), 
Windows event logs, VPN logs etc. A SOC (Security 
Operations Center) team develops use cases with a pre-
determined severity based on the analyst’s experiences. They 
are typically rule based involving one or two indicators. These 
rules can be network/host based or time/frequency based. Some 
examples are:  
 Detection of multiple malware infections that cannot 
be cleaned by endpoint protection software 
 Failed login attempts towards the same PCI (Payment 
Card Industry) asset exceeding a certain number 
 Certain number of denied firewall events from PCI 
servers within a pre-specified time window 
    If any event triggers one or multiple use cases, the SIEM will 
generate an alert immediately. Then the analyst in the SOC team 
will investigate the alert to decide whether the host related to the 
alert is risky (true positive) or not (false positive).  However, 
SIEM generates a lot of the alerts, but with a very high false 
positive rate. The number of alerts per day is much more than 
the capacity of SOC. Therefore, SOC may choose to only 
investigate the alerts with high severity or suppress the same 
type of alerts (for example, if the same type of alerts keep 
triggering within 7 days, then the same alerts will be ignored by 
SOC). This could potentially miss some severe attacks. 
Consequently, a more intelligent and automatic system is 
required to identify risky hosts. 
    Machine learning has been adopted in network intrusion 
detections and malware classifications. However, to the best of 
our knowledge, little research focuses on detecting 
compromised hosts by machine learning models. Compared to 
network intrusion detection, risky host detection is much more 
challenging. As to network intrusion detection, the features are 
more objective. For example, if a file creates auto-run tasks or 
injects code into other processes, or if denial of service attack 
happens on a web server, the labels are easier to create without 
manual inspection, i.e., endpoint protection software or network 
intrusion detection system can automatically catch the malicious 
file or intrusion behaviors. However, in risky host detection, it 
is related to host/user behavior, so the problem is more 
subjective and complicated. Usually, SOC analyst needs to 
spend a lot of time investigating multiple alerts from the host to 
determine if it is risky, hence the label generation process is 
highly manual and labor intensive. Our research aims at this 
challenge and tries to provide better decision support for the 
SOC analyst. 
Specifically, our approach utilizes Deep Belief Network to 
evaluate host risk according to events logs from endpoint, 
firewalls, intrusion detection systems, DNS (Domain Name 
System), DHCP (Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol), 
Windows event logs, VPN logs etc. Based on this information, 
we will evaluate host state (risky or not). This approach can 
provide the security analyst a risk score for every host and the 
security analyst can focus on those with high risk scores.  
There are two major advantages of Deep Belief Network over 
other machine learning models: 
 Hosts’ behaviors or features are very complicated. For 
example, a host may visit different malicious websites, 
download/upload different files or have different 
malware infections at the same time. In fact, we create 
hundreds of features per day for each host to describe 
its security posture. The greatest advantage of Deep 
Belief Network is its capability of “learning complex 
features”, which is achieved by its layer-by-layer 
learning strategy where the higher-level features are 
learned from the previous layers (for example, in face 
recognition, higher layer learns from pixels to lines to 
noses to faces) hence the higher-level features better 
extract the information from the input data’s 
structures. 
 Hosts’ labels are very limited. Traditional supervised 
machine learning methods rely on sufficient amount of 
labels to make accurate predictions, while in our 
problem, only few hosts (~1%) have labels, which 
brings a big challenge to traditional supervised 
learning methods. However, Deep Belief Network is a 
great fit for this challenge as it integrates unsupervised 
learning into its network training. Deep Belief 
Network can be viewed as a composition of 
unsupervised Restricted Boltzmann Machines, where 
each Restricted Boltzmann Machine’s hidden layer 
serves as the visible layer for the next. This leads to a 
layer-by-layer unsupervised training procedure and 
supervised learning is only applied at the end to fine-
tune the network parameters and convert the learned 
representation into probability predictions (for 
example, softmax function is used in the last layer to 
convert the outputs from hidden layers to probability 
predictions). Therefore, Deep Belief Network has less 
dependence on initial labels and we expect it to 
perform better for our problem with limited labels.  
The main contribution of this paper is as follows: 
 An advanced machine learning system is proposed and 
evaluated by real industry data from Symantec. The 
system can effectively reduce the resources to analyze 
alerts manually while at the same time enhance 
enterprise security.  
 A novel data engineering process is provided which 
integrates alert information, security logs, and SOC 
analysts’ investigation notes to generate features and 
labels for machine learning models. 
 To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper 
which applies a Deep Belief Network to evaluate host 
risk. In addition, when compared with other machine 
learning models such as Multi-layer Neural Network, 
Deep Neural Network, Random Forest, Support 
Vector Machine and Logistic Regression, Deep Belief 
Network shows the best performance for highly 
unbalanced labelled data. 
    The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 
II, related work is summarized. Section III briefly describes 
Restricted Boltzmann Machine and Deep Belief Network, 
which is the core machine learning method in our research. 
Section IV introduces feature engineering and label creation. In 
Section V, experiment results on real industry data are 
discussed. Section VI concludes the whole paper. 
II. RELATED WORK 
A. Conventional machine learning model 
    Machine learning models have been applied to detect 
anomalies and intrusions [2]. In [3], nine classifiers (Bayesian 
Network, Logistic Regression, Random Forest etc.) were 
compared in malicious traffic detection. In [4], fuzzy clustering 
was introduced to decrease the false positive rate. K-Means 
clustering was used towards scalable unsupervised intrusion 
detection [5]. Dynamic behavior models such as Hidden 
Markov Model were adopted to detect intrusions based on host’s 
user profiles built from normal usage data [6].  
    Li et al. presented an online Support Vector Machine (SVM) 
with decision tree to classify host state based on network traffic 
behavior [7]. Chand et al. combined nine other machine learning 
models with SVM to obtain better performance in intrusion 
detection [8]. In [9], a hybrid model combining SVM, decision 
tree and Naïve Bayes was proposed. In [10], enhanced SVM 
was used for network anomaly detection. In [11], Meng 
compared different machine learning models including artificial 
neural network, SVM and decision tree for network anomaly 
intrusion detection. In [12], Silva et al. used neural network and 
SVM to automatically detect hosts that disseminate web spam. 
B. Deep Learning Model 
    More complicated models such as Deep Neural Network 
(DNN) and Deep Belief Network (DBN) have been applied to 
identify malicious intrusion. Min-Ju et al. adopted deep neural 
network for in-vehicle network intrusion detection [13].  
    In [14], Deep Belief Network was applied to intrusion 
detection and showed better performance than SVM. In [15], 
Liu et al. applied extreme learning machine to the training 
process of Deep Belief Network and improved the model 
performance in network intrusion detection. Current research is 
mainly based on some historical simulated or experimental data 
instead of real industry data, such as NSL KDD [16]. What is 
more, little research analyzes the security state of machines 
based on the alert information. To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first paper which applies Deep Belief Network to 
evaluate host risk on real industry data.  
III. DEEP BELIEF NETWORK 
    Deep Belief Network has two main differences from Deep 
Neural Network: 
 Network topology: Deep Neural Network is a feed-
forward network with more than one hidden layers. 
Each hidden neuron typically uses the logistic/sigmoid 
activation function. In contrast, Deep Belief Network 
has undirected connections between hidden layers 
composed of stacked Restricted Boltzmann Machines.  
 Network training: Deep Neural Network requires 
labelled data in the whole backpropagation training 
process to adjust its weights. In contrast, Deep Belief 
Network uses unsupervised pre-training by contrastive 
divergence and then fine-tunes the weights by 
backpropagation.   
    Deep Neural Network generally needs a large amount of 
balanced labeled data, but the majority of industry data lack 
such labels. Deep Belief Network is one kind of unsupervised 
probabilistic generative model and is mainly constructed by 
stacking Restricted Boltzmann Machines. The parameters for 
the stacked Restricted Boltzmann Machines are trained by 
contrastive divergence (CD) algorithm [17]. Since CD is 
unsupervised learning, labeled data are not needed in this stage. 
In the second stage, the pre-trained network will be adjusted by 
supervised learning model such as softmax/logistic regression 
or linear classifier with gradient descent learning process [18]. 
However, the parameters of Deep Belief Network are almost 
fixed after CD and the second stage only fine-tunes the model 
parameters. Therefore, fewer labeled data is needed in Deep 
Belief Network. We will provide more details on Deep Belief 
Network in the following sections. 
A. Restricted Boltzmann Machine 
    Restricted Boltzmann Machine (RBM) is a two-layer 
stochastic model. As shown in Figure 1, it includes hidden layer 
and visible layer. The visible layer consists of visible states V= 
(v1,…,vm), while hidden layer has states H = (h1,…,hn) which 
cannot be measured directly. Between two layers, the states are 
fully connected [19]. However, there are no connections among 
the states within the same layer which means that the states in 
the same layer are mutually independent.   
 
Fig. 1. Restricted Boltzmann Machine 
Restricted Boltzmann Machine is one kind of energy-based 
model. It associates a scalar energy to each configuration of the 
variables of interest. The learning process involves adjusting 
the energy function so that its shape has desirable properties. 
For Restricted Boltzmann Machine, the joint probability 
distribution for (v, h) is given by Equation (1) through an 
energy function: 
𝑝(𝒗, 𝒉) =
1
𝑍
𝑒−𝐸(𝒗,𝒉)                            (1) 
    The energy function E(v, h) is defined in Equation (2), where 
wij represents the weight between hidden state hi and visible 
state vj. bi and aj are offsets or biases as shown in Figure 1, 
which are constant values. The bias is used to shift energy 
function in the training process to get better model 
performance.  
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(2) 
The marginal probability for v can be calculated by taking 
the sum of 𝑒−𝐸(𝒗,𝒉) over 𝒉: 
𝑝(𝒗) =
1
𝑍
∑ 𝑒−𝐸(𝒗,𝒉)𝒉                           (3) 
where Z is the normalization factor which is the sum of all 
combinations of (v, h): 
𝑍 = ∑ 𝑒−𝐸(𝒗,𝒉)𝒗,𝒉                                 (4) 
    In the common case of binary states (where 𝑣𝑗 and ℎ𝑖 ∈ {0, 
1}), the probability that 𝑣𝑗 = 1 given 𝒉 can be calculated from 
Equation (5).  𝜎(. )  is the sigmoid function, where 𝜎(𝑥) =
1/(1 + exp (−𝑥)). 
       𝑝(𝑣𝑗 = 1|𝒉) = 𝜎(𝑎𝑗 + ∑ ℎ𝑖𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑖 )                 (5) 
    Similarly, given v, the probability that ℎ𝑖 = 1  can be 
calculated from Equation (6): 
𝑝(ℎ𝑖 = 1|𝒗) =  𝜎(𝑏𝑖 + ∑ 𝑣𝑗𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑗 )                  (6) 
B. Restricted Boltzmann Machine Training 
The main task for Restricted Boltzmann Machine training is 
to learn the weight matrix 𝑊 = {𝑤𝑖𝑗} that maximizes the log 
likelihood log 𝑝(𝑣). From Equations (2) and (3), we have, 
𝜕𝐸(𝒗, 𝒉)
𝜕𝑤𝑖𝑗
= −𝑣𝑗ℎ𝑖    ⟹ 
𝜕log𝑝(𝒗)
𝜕𝑤𝑖𝑗
= 〈𝑣𝑗ℎ𝑖〉
0 − 〈𝑣𝑗ℎ𝑖〉
∞  ⟹ 
∆𝑤𝑖𝑗 = 𝜖(〈𝑣𝑗ℎ𝑖〉
0 − 〈𝑣𝑗ℎ𝑖〉
∞)                       (7) 
where 〈𝑣𝑗ℎ𝑖〉
𝑡 , 𝑡 = 0, … , ∞denotes the expectation of random 
variable 𝑣𝑗ℎ𝑖 at sampling step t and 𝜖 is the learning rate for 
weight updating. Sampling of 〈𝑣𝑗ℎ𝑖〉
𝑡  can be obtained by 
running a Markov chain to convergence through Gibbs 
sampling. For Restricted Boltzmann Machine, since visible 
state and hidden state are conditionally independent, visible 
states can be sampled simultaneously given fixed values of the 
hidden states. Similarly, hidden states can be sampled 
simultaneously given the visible states. Therefore, given ℎ𝑖
𝑡 or 
𝑣𝑗
𝑡  at step t, ℎ𝑖
𝑡+1 or 𝑣𝑗
𝑡+1 at step 𝑡 + 1 can be obtained by 
Equations (5) and (6). That is, ℎ𝑖
𝑡+1 is set as 1 with probability 
𝜎(𝑏𝑖 + ∑ 𝑣𝑗
𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑗 ), and 𝑣𝑗
𝑡+1 is set at 1 with probability 𝜎(𝑎𝑗 +
∑ ℎ𝑖
𝑡+1𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑖 ). As 𝑡 → ∞, the samples will be approaching true 
samples from 𝑝(𝒗). Figure 2 illustrates this sampling process. 
 
Fig. 2. Restricted Boltzmann Machine sampling process 
Contrastive Divergence (CD) is an efficient way to speed up 
the sampling process [19]. First, instead of initiating the 
Markov chain randomly, it starts from training samples that are 
closer to the true distribution, so the chain will converge faster. 
Second, CD does not wait for the Markov chain to fully 
converge. Instead, it will stop after k steps of Gibbs sampling. 
Previous research found that even for small k (in practice, k is 
often set as 1), the algorithm obtains close results to the final 
maximum likelihood solution [20].                                                                              
C. Deep Belief Network Structure 
    Deep Belief Network is a probabilistic generative model. As 
shown in Figure 3, Deep Belief Network is primarily 
constructed by stacking Restricted Boltzmann Machines. It has 
two parts: stacked Restricted Boltzmann Machines and 
classifier. The training process for Deep Belief Network 
includes pre-training and fine-tuning respectively. 
 
Fig. 3. Structure of Deep Belief Network 
1) Pre-training 
The pre-training is applied to stacked Restricted Boltzmann 
Machines. The hidden layer of the previous Restricted 
Boltzmann Machine will be the visible layer of the next 
Restricted Boltzmann Machine. Let X be the input matrix, the 
pre-training process is described below: 
1. Train first layer of Restricted Boltzmann Machine on 
X to obtain the weight matrix using Contrastive 
Divergence algorithm 
2. Transform X with the weight matrix to reconstruct 
new data X’ 
3. Use X’ as new input, 𝑋′ → 𝑋, for the next two layers 
of Restricted Boltzmann Machines 
4. Repeat Step 1 to Step 3 until the last two layers of the 
network are reached 
2) Fine-tuning 
    In our research, backpropagation and softmax regression are 
used in fine-tuning of Deep Belief Network. 
 Backpropagation: Backpropagation is used to adjust 
weights by the derivative chain principle on model 
errors. The error will be propagated from the last layer 
to the first layer. Two key parameters here are batch 
size and number of epochs. In fine-tuning, training 
samples are divided into groups with same size. Batch 
size is the number of samples in each group fed to the 
network before weight updates are performed. 
Number of epochs is related to the iterations of fine-
tuning. Generally speaking, the network will undergo 
more fine-tunings with smaller batch size or larger 
number of epochs [21]. 
 Softmax regression: Softmax regression is the 
extension of logistic regression, which can be applied 
to more than two classes. The conditional probability 
of Y=l (class l) given stacked Restricted Boltzmann 
Machines’ output X’, coefficient matrix C and 
intercept d is shown in Equation (8). Final prediction 
is the class with largest probability in Equation (9).  
𝑃(𝑌 = 𝑙|𝑋′, 𝐶, 𝑑) =
𝑒𝑐𝑙
𝑇𝑥′+𝑑𝑙
∑ 𝑒𝑐𝑘
𝑇𝑥′+𝑑𝑘𝑘
                    (8) 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑙𝜖𝐿{𝑃(𝑌 = 𝑙|𝑋′, 𝐶, 𝑑)}        (9) 
IV. FEATURE ENGINEERING AND TARGET CREATION 
A. Raw Data Description 
    The raw data is collected from Symantec internal security 
logs. It consists of alerts from SIEM system, notes from 
analysts’ investigation, and logs from different sources, 
including firewall, intrusion detection/prevention system, 
HTTP/FTP/DNS traffic, DHCP, vulnerability scanning, 
Windows security event, VPN and so on. The logs have 
terabytes of data each day. Table 1 lists key elements in SIEM 
alert data: 
TABLE I.  SIEM ALERT DATA ELEMENTS 
Field Name Description 
Host_ID Host name (e.g., “Dell-PC-0001”) 
Event_ID 
Security event 
(e.g. “SYS0206 – Malware Not Remediated”) 
Time Event time stamp 
Severity Event security (e.g. 1-10) 
 
    Analyst’s investigation “notes” or annotations are usually 
stored in a ticketing system (such as OTRS or Resilient) as free-
form text. The note contains information on whether an alert is 
true positive or not and we use it to create labels for machine 
learning dataset. 
B. Feature Engineering 
   Before feeding to our model, the raw data needs to be pre-
processed, since the industry data is not well-structured. 
Although deep learning models are able to derive features 
internally and automatically, we still have to generate initial 
features from raw data for the input layer as we normally do for 
conventional machine learning models. The steps of feature 
engineering are illustrated below: 
SIEM Alerts & Various Logs
Feature Creation
Analyst Notes
Text Mining
Host Label
Modeling Dataset
 
Fig. 4. Data engineering process 
    The features are created at the individual host level as our 
main goal is to predict the host’s risk. We have created 100 
features to describe a host. The features can be classified in the 
following four categories: 
 Summary features: these features can be generated 
from statistical summaries. For example, the number 
of “Malware Not Remediated” event over the last 24 
hours, or the number of high severity events (severity 
over 7) over the past 7 days. 
 Indicator features: these features are in binary (0 or 1) 
format, for example, whether “Malware Not 
Remediated” event happens over weekend. 
 Temporal features: these features include time 
information, for example, security event arrival rate, 
which takes into account the time interval between two 
consecutive events. 
 Relational features: these features are derived from 
social graph analysis, for example, host weighted 
PageRank value calculated from host-event graph 
[22]. The nodes are hosts or events. The relationship 
between a host and its events is represented by edge in 
graph, and the edge weight is the number of certain 
event on a host. Below is an example of a subgraph on 
one certain host with its security events and some 
weighted PageRank values derived from the bigger 
graph with more host and events. Higher PageRank 
implies more suspicious host behaviors. 
 
Fig. 5. Example on host weighted pagerank feature 
C. Label Generation 
    After all features are generated, we need to assign targets or 
“labels” for our machine learning models. The labels are 
obtained by mining analyst’s investigation notes, including but 
not limited to: 
 Initial background: the reasons why an alert was 
triggered. 
 Internal research: support information from different 
internal system logs. 
 External research: support information from external 
resources, such as IP geolocation and reputation. 
 Investigation result: whether the event is non-
malicious, false positive, or escalated.  
    Text mining techniques, such as key word/topic extraction 
and sentiment analysis, are required to extract the host’s actual 
state. Here are some examples from text mining: 
 Topic 1: “Unable to gather supporting evidence for 
this alert”  Host status from text mining: normal 
 Topic 2: “Host made connections with malicious 
domains”  Host status from text mining: risky 
 Topic 3: “Advanced malware infection detected on 
this host”   Host status from text mining: risky 
    Finally, we attach the labels from text mining as the targets 
for our machine learning models. The final analytic dataset will 
look like this: 
TABLE II.  EXAMPLE ON FINAL MODELING DATASET 
Host 
ID 
Summary 
 feature 1 
Indicator 
feature 2 
Temporal 
feature 3 
Relational 
feature 4 
… Label 
Host1 13 1 0.65 5.17 … 1 (risky) 
Host2 25 0 2.74 9.34 … 1 (risky) 
Host3 4 0 1.33 3.52 … 
0 
(normal) 
V. EXPERIMENT RESULTS 
A. Model Performance Measures 
    The dataset includes one month’s security events with 
20,572 distinct hosts and 100 features. The dataset is highly 
unbalanced with only ~1% of host verified as risky by security 
analyst. Therefore, current rule-based system is not very 
effective and generates a lot of false positives. Security analysts 
spend a lot of time investigating non-risky hosts. The 
unbalanced data also significantly increases the challenges to 
predict risky hosts for machine learning models. 
    As a common practice, we split the data randomly into 
training (75% of the samples) and testing (remaining 25%) sets.  
We tried different training/test split ratios between training and 
test data (i.e., 50% / 50%, 60% / 40% and 75% / 25%), but we 
noticed that the split ratios had little impact on classification 
results. Due to the space limitation, we only discuss the 
experiment results with 75% / 25% split. In the testing data, we 
have 5,143 hosts but only 60 of them (1.17%) have been 
verified as risky by security analyst. We will test different 
machine learning models to see if they can perform better than 
current rule-based system. The measures of goodness are 
defined in Equations (10) to (12) below: 
Model AUC 
≈  ∑
𝑦𝑖+1+𝑦𝑖
2
× (𝑥𝑖+1 − 𝑥𝑖),𝑖
where (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖) is the point on ROC curve       
 (10) 
Model Detection Rate 
         =  
Number of Risky Hosts in Certain Predictions
Total Number of Risky Hosts
× 100% 
(11) 
Model Lift 
=  
Proportion of Risky Hosts in Certain Predictions
Overall Proportion of Risky Hosts 
   
                        (12) 
Area under ROC Curve (AUC) evaluates model’s overall 
accuracy by approximating the region under the Receiver 
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve. ROC curve displays the 
tradeoff between true positive rate (TPR) and false positive rate 
(FPR) of a classifier, where TPR is plotted along the y axis and 
FPR is plotted along the x axis. If the model is simply random 
guessing, its AUC value will be 0.5. The closer the ROC gets to 
the optimal point of perfect prediction (where FPR=0 and 
TPR=1), the closer the AUC gets to 1. 
Different from AUC that evaluates model on the whole test 
data, detection rate and lift reflect how good the model is in 
discovering risky hosts among different portions of predictions. 
To calculate these two metrics, the results are first sorted by the 
model scores (the probability of a host being risky in our case) 
in descending order. Detection rate measures the effectiveness 
of a classification model as the ratio between the results 
obtained with and without the model. For example, suppose we 
take the top 10% of the predictions, and the model captures 30 
actual risky hosts, the detection rate for top 10% predictions is 
equal to 30⁄60=50% (note that we have verified 60 risky hosts 
in the test data). If we do this for 20%, 30%, etc. and then plot 
the detection rates from different portions of predictions, we get 
a detection rate chart. Similar to ROC curve, the better the 
classification model is, the steeper the line will be in detection 
rate chart. 
Lift measures how many times it is better to use a model in 
contrast to not using a model. Using the same example above, 
we have 30 risky hosts captured in top 10% predictions, the lift 
is equal to (30/514)/(60/5143)≈5. Assuming an unpredictive 
model that is no better than current rule-based system, the 
baseline lift value will be 1. Similar to detection rate chart, we 
can vary the portions of predictions and plot the lift values on a 
lift chart. Higher lift implies better performance from a model 
on certain predictions. 
B. Model Parameters 
    The settings of Deep Belief Network are: 
 Number of epochs for fine-tuning is 100. 
 Four layers with one input layer, two hidden layers and 
one output layer. Each layer has 100, 20, 10, 2 neurons 
respectively. Note that adding more hidden neurons 
may lead to model over fitting so it will not be helpful 
to the model performance. Figure 6 shows the 
simulation over different number of hidden neurons N, 
where the layer neurons vary over (100, N, N/2, 2). It 
can be seen that model training time increases almost 
linearly with N, which implies that the model has good 
scalability with more hidden neurons. On the other 
hand, AUC on test data goes up when N<25 and starts 
to drop after that, which may indicate that the 
network’s generalizability decreases with too many 
hidden neurons. We tried more complicated structure 
with more neurons and layers, but there is no obvious 
performance improvement, so we decide to go with 
simpler network structure. 
Fig. 6. AUC/training time with respect to number of hidden neurons 
Fig. 7. AUC/training time with respect to DBN batch size 
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 Batch size is set as 50. For smaller batch size, the 
model may fit the data better but has higher 
computational cost. From some simulations shown in 
Figure 7, we find that the training time has a steeper 
fall when batch size is less than 50, then it gets steady 
after that. Also AUC on test data tends to drop with 
larger batch size. AUC is close to the best value when 
batch size is 50. Therefore, it is reasonable to set batch 
size as 50 with good balance between training time and 
model accuracy. 
    Other machine learning models include: 
 Multi-layer Neural Network (MNN): Three layers with 
one input layer, one hidden layer and one output layer. 
Each layer has 100, 50, 2 neurons respectively. 
 Deep Neural Network (DNN): Four layers with one 
input layer, two hidden layers and one output layer. 
Each layer has 100, 20, 10, 2 neurons respectively. The 
layer setting is the same as Deep Belief Network so as 
to compare the performance between these two deep 
learning methods. 
 Random Forest (RF): 100 decision trees with entropy-
based splits. 
 Support Vector Machine (SVM): with radial basis 
function kernel. 
 Logistic Regression (LR): generalized linear model 
with Binomial family and Logit link function. 
C. Experiment Results 
The first thing we notice in our experiment is that Deep 
Neural Network does not work well for our problem, which has 
lowest AUC value on test dataset. We will discuss this further 
in Section VI. In this section, some abbreviations will be used: 
“DBN” for Deep Belief Network, “MNN” for Multi-layer 
Neural Network, “RF” for Random Forest, “SVM” for Support 
Vector Machine, “LR” for Logistic Regression, and “DNN” for 
Deep Neural Network.  
The table below lists AUC of different models on test data. 
We vary the random samples in the training and test data and 
both mean and standard error of AUC are provided in Table III. 
As we expected, DBN has highest AUC among all models. 
Generally, AUC over 0.8 indicates that the model works fairly 
well. With average AUC value close to 0.85, DBN achieves 
satisfying accuracy on risky host detection.  
In addition, SVM and DNN have much higher standard errors 
on AUC, implying that these two methods are more sensitive to 
training samples. On the other hand, DBN has highest average 
AUC value with relatively small standard error. This shows that 
DBN is not only more accurate than other models but also more 
robust to the variations of input data. Figure 8 shows the ROC 
curves corresponding to the best AUC values from different 
models. 
 
 
 
TABLE III.  MODEL AUC ON TEST DATA 
 DBN MNN RF SVM LR DNN 
MEAN 0.844 0.807 0.829 0.775 0.754 0.624 
S.D. 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.016 0.008 0.020 
 
Fig. 8. ROC curves from different models (best AUC values) 
As to detection rate and lift, we analyzed the best results from 
each model on different test data. Table IV lists the detection 
rates for different models on top 5% to 20% predictions 
respectively. Considering that we only have 1.17% risky hosts 
in this test dataset, it is promising that DBN is able to detect over 
88% of the true risky cases with only 20% highest predictions - 
more than 8 points higher than other models. Again we can find 
out that DNN performs worse than other models.  
TABLE IV.  MODEL DETECTION RATES ON TOP 5%~20% PREDICTIONS 
Top % 
Predictions DBN MNN RF SVM LR DNN 
5% 35.00% 31.67% 25.00% 20.00% 31.67% 38.33% 
10% 65.00% 58.33% 43.33% 46.67% 50.00% 45.00% 
15% 78.33% 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 68.33% 46.67% 
20% 88.33% 78.33% 80.00% 80.00% 76.67% 48.33% 
 
The detection rates with respect to different prediction 
proportions are shown in Figure 9. DBN is much better than 
other models until the prediction proportion reaches top 40%. 
Since the predictions will be used as host risk ranking scores, 
DBN is more valuable as it detects more risky hosts with less 
predictions. This is very helpful as SOC analyst has limited 
resources for investigation. 
 
Fig. 9. Model detection rates on different proportions of predictions 
    Finally, we evaluate model lift with top 5% to 20% 
predictions. The result is listed in Table V. For top 5% 
predictions, the lift value of DBN is 7.61, meaning that its 
performance is 7 times better than current rule-based system. 
DNN also gets good lift value as 8.40 for top 5% predictions, 
but its performance degrades quickly. For example, with top 
15% predictions, DNN’s lift value is worse than other five 
models, while DBN still performs really well.   
Moreover, DBN tends to capture more risky hosts in higher 
predictions, which can be seen from the monotonically 
descending lift values. RF and SVM, on the other hand, may 
place some risky hosts in lower prediction buckets. For 
example, the lift value of RF at top 15% predictions (4.92) is 
higher than the lift value at top 10% predictions (4.55), so the 
percentage of risky hosts in top 10% predictions is actually 
lower than that in top 15% predictions, indicating that some 
risky hosts cannot be captured in top 10% predictions and the 
model needs to include more predictions to cover these risky 
hosts, which is less useful in practice since SOC analyst is only 
able to look at less than 10% suspicious hosts.  
If we look at the average lifts on top 5% to 20% predictions, 
DBN is the highest which is over 6 as listed on the last row of 
Table V. This is very promising. The model lifts on different 
proportions of predictions are shown in Figure 10. Generally 
speaking, DBN performs the best, followed by MNN and LR. 
TABLE V.  MODEL LIFTS ON TOP 5%~20% PREDICTIONS 
Top % of 
Predictions DBN MNN RF SVM LR DNN 
5% 7.61 6.82 5.30 4.19 6.82 8.40 
10% 7.01 6.25 4.55 4.92 5.30 4.74 
15% 5.55 4.92 4.92 4.92 4.80 3.22 
20% 4.65 4.09 4.19 4.19 4.00 2.48 
Average 6.21 5.52 4.74 4.56 5.23 4.71 
  
Fig. 10. Model lifts on different proportions of predictions 
D. Model Implementations 
    Currently the proposed machine learning system has been 
implemented in a real enterprise production environment as 
illustrated in Figure 11.  
 
Fig. 11. Model implements in production system 
The features and labels are being updated daily from 
historical data. Then the machine learning model is refreshed 
and deployed to the scoring engine daily to make sure it 
captures the latest patterns from the data. After that, the risk 
scores are generated in real time when new alerts are triggered, 
so SOC analysts can take action right away for high risk hosts. 
Finally,  SOC analysts’ notes will be collected and fed back 
into historical data for future model refinement. The whole 
process has been streamlined automatically from data 
integration to score generation. The system also actively learns 
new insights generated from analysts’ investigations.  
Regarding computational cost, we run the machine learning 
system on a comodity workstation (4-core Xeon CPU with 
32GB ram). The whole Deep Belief Network training and 
scoring process can be completed in less than 30 minutes. As 
the machine learning system is running on a daily basis, the 
computational cost is trivial. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS 
    Different from previous research on network intrusion 
detection, a novel approach based on Deep Belief Network is 
proposed, which leverages big data of various security logs, 
alert information, and analyst insights to the identification of 
risky host. In order to validate the effectiveness of our model, 
other classifiers are also applied to the same dataset. The result 
shows that Deep Belief Network is able to learn more insights 
from the highly unbalanced data than traditional machine 
learning models. Its average AUC on test data is close to 0.85 
and average lift on top 20% predictions is over 6 times better 
than current rule-based system. The whole machine learning 
system is implemented in production environment to score and 
flag risky hosts in real time while updating itself by 
incorporating analysts’ feedbacks from investigations. The 
system is fully automated from data acquisition, daily model 
refreshing, to real time scoring, which greatly improve SOC 
analyst’s efficiency and enhance enterprise risk detection and 
management.  
    From the experiments, we notice that Deep Neural Network 
does not perform very well on this problem, while it has been 
very successful in other fields such as image recognition 
applications. The reasons are: 
 Image recognition has a large amount of balanced 
labelled samples, while in our problem the dataset is 
smaller and highly unbalanced. Deep Neural Network 
can easily get stuck in a local optimum, leading to high 
generalization of errors and over-fitting as the network 
structure becomes more complicated. 
 Deep Belief Network, on the other hand, does not rely 
on labels as much as Deep Neural Network. It mainly 
takes advantage of unsupervised learning in the pre-
training process to train the network structure, and 
labels are only used later to fine-tune the structure 
parameters with back-propagation. Hence Deep Belief 
Network is not only capable of learning non-linear 
relationships by deep network structure, but also more 
robust to overfitting than Deep Neural Network.  
     As to the future work, we will incorporate more information 
from enterprise network and add more features to improve the 
detection accuracy and at the same time decrease false positive 
rate. Deep Belief Network will also be combined with other 
deep learning models such as Convolutional Neural Network 
(CNN) to achieve better classification performance. 
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